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Introduction 
The current campaign on behalf of assisted suicide and euthanasia has 
gained much of its persuasiveness from the support given to it, in the eyes 
of many, by one powerful school of Catholic moral theologians in their 
discussions concerning cessation of treatment. The murky confusion 
generated among doctors, nurses, and hospital administrators by the 
resultant theological debates can only, I think, be dissipated by going back 
behind the norms that these various moralists have formulated, whether 
the new, quality-of-life ones or the ones accepted now for better than three 
hundred years. What is needed is to rederive the norms so that not only is 
their meaning clear but that their validity in the light of the faith is 
apparent. Hence, this is basically an effort at clarification. I shall try to 
recapture the original insights that enabled Catholic medical morals to 
develop. 
But to accomplish this, we need to bring back into the theological 
discussion of medical matters an ancient and long neglected notion, one 
that was ancient before moral theology itself was ever thought of, old even 
before God called Abraham, seemingly the oldest of human ethical 
categories: the sacred. 
This will not be easy. Though we still speak of the sacredness of human 
life, in our highly secularized society we are rapidly losing any notion of 
what these words mean or, like Peter Singer, know this meaning but reject 
it as having no basis in reality.' This weakening of our culture is not 
without influence - even among those most dedicated to preserving 
human life. And, unfortunately, moral language itself no longer offers an 
easy entry to such a discussion. Indeed, the principles of the dominant 
schools of medical ethics today, the "principle of individual autonomy" 
and the so-called "principle of beneficence", both stand in contradiction to 
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the principle of the sacredness of human life, in which Catholic moral 
theology is rooted. 
The Holy and the Sacred 
First, then, let me clarify a bit the language we shall need: such terms as 
"holiness," "sanctity," and "sacredness." Then, I shall sketch the reasons 
for speaking of human life as sacred. Finally, I shall attempt to show, in the 
current disputes over initiation and cessation of medical treatment, what a 
moral theology calls for that expressly considers the sacredness of the 
human person. 
"Holiness" and "sanctity" we shall here take as equivalent. Both terms 
are often used to refer to a certain exalted perfection of moral life. 
Originally, however, neither "sanctity" nor "holiness" referred to anything 
on the moral order but to that in God by which He is divine. 
For example, God and man are enough alike that the Scriptures can 
speak of God's anger, His jealousy, His love. But by His holiness He is 
utterly beyond any comparison with man or any other creature, beyond 
created comprehension - He is the One before whom all angels, even the 
seraphim, must cover their faces as they adore Him. 
On the other hand, though "sacred" is often taken as equivalent to 
"holy", yet the original meaning of "sacred" is quite distinct. Something is 
sacred if it has been set apart entirely and exclusively for the service and 
honor of God. What is sacred, therefore, has been removed from all 
independent use by creatures. Sometimes this is done by man through 
sacrifice ("sacrifice" means, literally, to "make sacred"); sometimes, by 
God Himself. What has been consecrated to the Holy One is inviolate, not 
to be touched by man. Definitively removed from human authority and 
control, it is not subject to our will or to our initiatives. What is sacred is 
owned by God and by Him alone. Only the All-Holy can have the sacred as 
His possession. 
Finally, whatever on the created level is holy, i.e. , which has been 
granted a participation in God's own life, is thereby sacred; but things that 
are sacred need not be holy. To render the holy unholy - mortal sin is the 
principal example - is the greatest desecration; but there are many other, 
less dramatic modes of desecration of those things that are sacred without 
being holy. 
The response called forth in us when confronted with sanctity is awe; our 
response to the sacred is reverence. But, though the sacred and the holy are 
interrelated, reverence and awe are not simply different degrees or 
. intensities of one same attitude. 
Awe is often described as a sort of profound fear: "The fear of the Lord is 
the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. Ill: 10). But this is not the sort of fear we 
should feel if, say, someone here were to pull out an attack-rifle and begin 
firing at us. The awful or the holy is not so much a danger or threat 
-though it seems to us somehow related to each - as it is something 
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incalculable and overwhelming, beyond all our categories. Awe is the 
primordial experience of the divine and the experiential basis of all 
religion. 
Yet though man trembles before God, awe is not unpleasant and 
repugnant, as is fear; nor is it something we seek to avoid or to overcome. 
Rather, the more man knows that he has reason to tremble, the more he is 
dra wn towards this Incomprehensible with a more than earthly fascination 
and desire to love God and to be loved by Him. 
Reverence, however, is less active than the intensely focussed 
attentiveness that is awe. For the sacred, as both its definition and its 
linguistic derivation indicate, is passive in its relation to the Holy. If a man 
violates what is sacred, he may be conscious of sin, of somehow damaging 
the roots of his own being. But he will not think that he has been damaged 
or threatened by the object he has desecrated - though he may fear the 
anger of Him to whom it was sacred. 
Reverence dra ws back in the presence of the sacred and feels rebuked if 
it has already thought to make some claim upon it or to plan to use it. 
Reverence defers to its object, leaves room for it, lets it be, acknowledging 
it as something belonging to the Holy One alone. Reverence does not seek 
to make something else out of the sacred, or to put it to use, or to control it. 
Through reverence, we sense the limits that this antecedent bond to the 
Holy One sets to our own plans, desires, and projects.2 
The Sacredness of Human Life 
Now, I shall argue that the life of each human being is sacred, i.e., that 
the human person is sacred universally because sacred intrinsically, sacred 
because he is human, independently of his value, beauty, skills, and 
capabilities, independently even of his moral goodness. Thence it follows 
that the obligation never to treat the human person as if subject to human 
wills and purposes is unconditional or absolute.3 
For the Christian, the proofis direct and simple: Descended from Adam 
and Eve, we all have a common origin and the same nature. Adam and Eve 
were created in the Father's Image and according to His Likeness. Our 
nature, however, has been damaged by their fall; but it has also been 
redeemed by Christ. In Christ, then, all men have the same goal, eternal life 
with God Himself, who has loved all without exception. 
A certain confusion is to be avoided here. All things belong to God as 
their Creator, and to Him alone. This metaphysical belonging can only be 
called "sacredness' by some sort of weak analogy. For it is the relation of 
the created order as a whole to Him who stands totally outside of it as its 
sole source and complete cause. Hence, like every creature, man is, by 
creation itself, by his very nature, consecrated to the service and praise of 
God who created him. The sole function and destiny of every man, as of the 
whole creation, is to make God's glory manifest in himself. But all that is 
not enough to make man more sacred than any other animal. 
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The sacred in its proper sense refers, rather, to relations established 
within the created order. Assuming a world of which God is the Creator and 
over which He has set man as His vicegerent, a world within which God 
Himself acts in a quasi-creaturely manner (or in a wholly creaturely one, 
when He comes among us in Jesus), then certain things only are sacred: 
those which man has sacrificed or that God, as agent within the world, has 
taken for Himself. 
The confusing of these two, very different notions of the sacred was the 
root of much of the theological upheaval of which Harvey Cox's The 
Secular City was the popularization and which served as justification for 
much of the current craze for a secularized "Christianity" after Vatican II. 
For, if everything is sacred, then there is no distinction possible between the 
sacred and the profane; and the sacred melts easily into the merely secular. 
The sacred, then, is not just whatever belongs totally to God alone but 
what can be so described in the context of the world of men. Holiness is the 
unique mode of existence which is God's, whether He creates or not. This is 
true even when He makes His holiness to be participated in by a creature. 
But sacredness is a relation between some, not necessarily holy, creature 
and God. It refers to things that belong to man - admittedly only as God's 
creature - but that are, in fact, withdrawn, in some primary aspect of their 
being, wholly from his control, to be governed and directed entirely by the 
divine will. 
To declare man to be sacred requires that he be set apart, in this world, 
for life with God and for God and that he thereby be removed from any 
sUbjugation to a human will. Catholics easily advert to this sacredness in 
thinking of the bishop, the priest, the religious. But they often overlook the 
fact that every Christian has been made sacred by baptism. This we have 
tended to forget, that the baptized is a sacred person in a way that no 
nonbaptized person can be, even if, as often happens, the latter be far holier 
than many of the baptized. 
But can the nonbaptized person also be rightly called sacred in a sense 
stronger than that in which a wolf or a rose is, i.e., solely on the grounds of 
being created? It is here that we glimpse something of the grandeur of the 
redemption wrought by Christ. For, contrary to the Jansenists and 
scattered other heretics, Christ died for all men of all times. Thus, all have 
been set aside for God, whether they have any awareness of it or not, and 
made sacred to Him, set free in Christ from subjection to all other created 
wills, whether of angels or of men, save insofar as these are acting in God's 
place, as His delegates or deputies. 
Finally, it is the sacred character of each human being that alone can offer 
rational grounds for our defects and failures being reasons to help us rather 
than to eliminate us. This is especially important where, as in medicine, help 
to one person can work against the good of someone else. 
Now, none of this is radically new. Catholic moral teaching has always 
been rooted in this notion ofthe sacred. But like an apple left too long in the 
kitchen to ripen, the teaching, as set forth by moralists, has tended to 
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shrivel up, to lose its savor, and even here and there begin to rot. For, over 
nearly four hundred years, the emphasis has been placed on the practical 
norms and rules of conduct to be drawn from man's sacred status. 
Such norms are needed, and most have been doctrinally sound . But they 
have tended to treat the sacredness of man as that given by creation alone, 
that which does not differentiate him from any other creature. This makes 
life harder than need be for the moralist, who must then rummage about for 
some other, more particular grounds for asserting that, though we may 
rightly kill an animal for food and rightly shoot a gravely injured horse to 
spare it pain, it is morally wrong to do either to another man. 
Moreover, a chiefly practical approach tends to disjoin the sacred from 
the holy and to treat separately the moral demands made upon us by each. 
Worse, such an approach gives the appearance of reducing a moral precept 
to a simple legislative fiat by God, which, however well motivated on His 
part, is seen as an imposition upon man from without and as a restriction on 
his freedom, any constraints on which are today fiercely resented. 
But, if we understand that all men have been consecrated to the Father by 
the sacrifice of our Lord upon the cross, then God's moral demands are seen 
to be internal to us, belonging to us personally, by nature and as His sons by 
grace. His law is not an imposition by one who is alien to us but is the 
expression of our own inmost self. Our basic obligation to stand in awe of 
God and to worship Him took flesh in Christ; and it is in Him and because 
of His incarnation that we can indeed have reverence for all that He has 
created, in accordance with its own degree of sacredness. 
Cessation of Treatment 
Turning now to medical problems, how does all this apply to the 
questions concerning the withdrawal of treatment or not initiating it in the 
first place? 
The fundamental principle is that our living bodies, because they are 
simply ourselves - called "bodies" when we wish to emphasize our material 
aspect - are sacred and are always to be treated as sacred by ourselves and 
by others. The moralists have translated this into the principle that we are 
obliged to take reasonable care to stay alive and in good health and, since 
we are social beings, to help others to meet their similar obligation. Like 
every translation, something is lost in the process. So, it is worth our while 
to work through the translation in detail so as to recover the full force of the 
fundamental principle. 
The Obligations of the Individual Patient 
Now, in the matter of using "resonable care" to preserve life and health, 
the approach I am suggesting begins with the fact of the sacredness of every 
sick person. This sacredness, because its source lies not in the individual's 
qualities but in Christ's redemptive act, is wholly unaffected by the gravity 
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of one's illness. His sacredness suffers no diminishment because he is 
demented or in "persistent vegetative state" or in perpetual coma or but 
moments away from death. 
As sacred, one's life and bodily powers are not his own but are entrusted 
to him by God as to His steward. Consecrated to the Father, the patient has 
no master or lord except Him who rules by His love. Because he is sacred, 
neither his life nor his health can be subject to himself or to any other man. 
No one has a right to deal with him according to any merely human will or 
advantage. 
As mentioned earlier, one way to make something sacred is to destroy it 
in sacrifice, thus removing it definitively from human use or power. But, on 
the other hand, what is already sacred may not be destroyed by man. Just 
because it is sacred, it is not subject to us but lies outside the range of our will 
and is independent of our choice. Since, then, no one is free to destroy o"r 
damage on his own authority what is sacred, one's death may never be made 
the goal of his actions. Hence, "reasonable care to stay alive" involves an " 
unconditioned prohibition against seeking one's own death, as either an end 
or a means. 
But though we may never destroy what is sacred, yet precisely because the 
sacred is not subject to our own ends and desires, reverence can lay no 
absolute claim to preserve its object. Never violative of it, reverence need 
not always preserve or labor on behalf of it, as we see in the case of old 
church buildings or of battered or broken chalices. The sacred may be 
allowed to perish. Indeed, unless God orders otherwise, at times it must be 
allowed to perish; otherwise we would be treating it as our own property 
and not God's. 
Are we, then, ever free to labor at preserving what is sacred? Would this 
not be to show a will to keep it which is precisely that personal will and free 
choice that the sacred rebuffs? Yet if we revere something, we realize that to 
be indifferent to it or careless of its existence is itself a sort of desecration. " 
The sacred demands of us that we preserve it, yet not at all costs. 
Here, I think we must advert to the nature, in itself and independently of 
its consecration, of that which is sacred. If our action of preservation 
enables the sacred object to remain itself or, even, to serve its sacred 
purposes more suitably, then human action to preserve it is not a 
desecration. Such an action is done from reverence and without changing 
the object's nature or goal. For, the sacredness comes not from the being 
simply considered in itself but in its relation to God. Thus, so long as the 
ground of this relation is left intact, there is no desecration. 
To preserve a church, say, by converting it into a museum or a brothel is a 
desecration. But the normal means used to keep a building standing, e.g., 
tuckpointing and repairing the roof, do nothing contrary to its sacredness. 
Likewise, the absolute sacredness of the Eucharist is not violated by our 
keeping the Hosts in a tabernacle. This effort at preservation of the Hosts 
touches only their externality. Neither their All-Holy substance nor their 
sacred function is in any way altered. 
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We are free, then, to use the normal and natural means needed to 
maintain or repair the body and its functions. 4 The condition, of course, is 
that we do not pervert these functions from their natural goals as entrusted 
to us by God; for, this would involve desecration. 
Conversely, mutilation is never a legitimate goal, i.e. , one is forbidden 
any deliberate intent to deprive himself of some basic physical power or 
function as the goal of his action.5 As a means, however, a mutilation can be 
necessary in order to preserve one's life . This is not an illegitimate violation 
of the sacred for one's own advantage but is analogous to removing, say, a 
side chapel from a church as the only means to prevent the whole wall from 
buckling. 
This approach to medical ethics via the sacred offers a particularly easy 
way to explain why most surgery is quite licit, even though such injury to the 
same tissues or organs would not be permissible otherwise, e.g. , the cutting 
open of the rib cage needed in open-heart surgery. In older theories, surgery 
could seem to be a performing of a moral evil for the sake of a good end. 
Though, with enough care, this can be shown to be an incorrect inference 
"from its premisses, in the context of the sacred no problem even arises. 
As seen, it is permissible to repair what is sacred , if this be done in such 
fashion as not to violate its consecration. For, the sacred is not a physical 
but a moral category and , so, is not necessarily dam;lged by physical 
repairs. Thus, surgery directed to repair-work is licit. This is not the case, 
however, for a deliberate maiming. Any maiming or injury intended for its 
own sake must be strictly rejected. Hence, contraceptive sterilization or 
so-called sex-change surgery are wrong, since they radically alter the body's 
natural functioning and , hence, lie outside what care for the sacred permits. 
"Reasonable care of health" implies, evidently, that one may not treat his 
life or health negligently without some failing in reverence for what belongs 
to God. Even more would one incur the guilt of irreverence if he carelessly 
endangered his health, or abused it by freely chosen overindulgence, say, in 
alcohol or drugs. 
As to our particular question about withholding treatment, almost all 
sides in the current debates are in agreement that at some time before a man 
is dead it may be morally appropriate to refuse treatment, perhaps even to 
do without food and water. The moral question then becomes: under what 
conditions is a sick person morally free to refuse to begin or refuse to 
continue medical treatment? What aspects of the sacred are, in this context, 
contained in the norm that a patient must exercise "reasonable care" or use 
"appropriate means" to preserve his life or health? 
Traditionally, the response has been: a patient is morally obligated to use 
any, otherwise morally licit and medically effective means that are not 
gravely burdensome to him. 
Since the human person, though sacred, is also mortal, we are not obliged 
to oppose the natural deterioration of the body by every possible means. In 
fact, to clutch at one's life and to seek at all costs to preserve it would , under 
many circumstances, show a lack of reverence. For, such efforts could 
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repudiate the mortal nature that God has given man and reject His 
dominion over what is His alone. Medicine is, then, or should be, natural, 
that is, an art for the treatment of beings certain to die . Hence, one's 
sacredness does not make him morally free to demand of physicians, nurses, 
parents, or others just anything he chooses. 
To seek to use all available means to preserve one's life or health is to ask 
for what is, at once, impossible, irrational even if possible, and contrary to 
the sacredness of man as God now makes him. Thus, the man who made 
preservation of his own life the primary goal of his life would in all 
likelihood be one of those soonest to die. He could never ski or swim, he 
could never take a plane trip or ride in a car or even walk across a street. 
There is no way short of insanity that one can make preserving his life the 
primary goal of his life, or caring for his health the goal of his being healthy 
- even if, in old age, he is forced to spend most of his time doing so. 
A fortiori, must the patient be careful not to seek health or longer life 
through immoral means - a temptation that can become severe if it seems 
that one's life depends upon but a minor infraction of the moral law. 
"Immoral means" refers not only to objectively evil actions (e.g., having 
the heart excised from a living person to replace my own failing heart) but 
also to treatments that, in the words of Pope Pius XII, "would hinder the 
acquiring of higher goods of greater importance. Life, health, all temporal 
activity, are in fact on a lower plane than spiritual ends."6 Since the whole of 
man is sacred, and since it is as a spiritual being primarily that Christ's 
sacrifice affects him in this world , the sacredness of his spiritual and moral 
life takes precedence over any other. 
Hence, "reasonable care" has always to take into account not only our 
obligations to others, especially our dependents, but the whole range of our 
own spiritual needs. These latter, of course, involve meeting those 
obligations, but also much more. 
The subordination of the lesser sacredness of our physical lives to the 
greater sacredness of our spiritual lives is what grounds all discussion of 
treatments that are gravely burdensome. Hence, according to the principle 
mentioned earlier, apatient is not morally obliged even to take food or 
water ifin his concrete situation this would impose a more grave burden on 
him than he could bear without spiritual or psychic harm. The root of this 
exemption is reverence for God's image, principally present through the 
supernatural power of grace and the natural powers of mind and will. To 
ignore these aspects of man, to regard them as less sacred than the body, 
would be analogous to treating Jesus, the Image of God, in the Eucharist as 
less sacred than the tabernacle that holds Him. 
The notion of burdensomeness needs some clarifications. It used to be 
stated in terms of "heroic virtue", i.e. , a patient would be free to refuse any 
means of treatment that would require heroic virtue of him to bear. People's 
notions of the heroic fluctuate more perhaps than many of their other 
notions, leaving this norm with considerable ambiguity. Still, it has the 
merit of emphasizing the subjective condition of the patient and not merely 
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his objective situation. 
Moreover, the burden of pain can differ according to one's background 
and upbringing. Suppose a patient whose life is filled with grief and pain for 
reasons other than his illness. Though he is obliged to take food and water 
and to use reasonable means to preserve his life, he might rightly choose, 
because of his misery, not to use gravely burdensome means even though 
they might p'rove effetive. Indeed, in some cases, it is possible that a patient's 
misery could make it appreciably more difficult for him to tolerate means 
that others would tolerate easily. Something similar is true of patients' 
handicaps, physical or mental. . 
Even if one's life is burdensome, painful, full of misery, and requires 
heroism to continue, it is essential to distinguish the pain or burden that 
comes from the medical means used and that which comes from other 
sources. If a person's life is miserable; he need not make it more so. But he is 
not free to cut it short nor, out of impatience or anger, to refuse the minor 
inconveniences of ordinary care of his health. 
If a man who is gravely ill should receive word that he has lost his job, 
that his wife has divorced him, that his son is gay and dying of AIDS, that 
his daughter has abandoned her husband and five children for life as a 
married man's mistress, he may not discontinue the treatment in order to 
die the sooner. For, in this case, a choice not to use these means would cover 
a hidden choice to escape life's burdens by dying. Thus, to refuse food and 
water, when they can be taken without serious difficulty, would be a suicidal 
violation of the sacred . The obligation to use life-preserving means that do 
not themselves impose a grave burden remains. 
Yet, someone might rightly refuse a medically recommended chemo-
therapy if, while this offers him, say, an added 8 months oflife, it will cause 
him during that time such unremitting and serious pain and discomfort as 
might well prove harmful to his spiritual life. He need not take on so heavy a 
burden, though he may. If he should take it on, and later finds it too heavy, 
despite his best intentions, he remains free to discontinue it. 
So, too, painful ulcerations around a nasogastric tube could exempt a 
patient from continuing its use, or his inability to hold anything down, say 
through stomach cancer. If he is truly unconscious, however, there is 
evidently no burden for him in its use and no question of subjecting the 
more sacred to the less sacred. 
But what if the patient continues to pull out the tube? Would that not 
prove the gravity of the burden the tube constitutes for him? It could; but, 
unless he is fully competent and can say so, it need not. But if restraints must 
be used , would they not constitute a grave burden upon him? Very possibly, 
though there would be many things to do before one came to a decision that 
such use is gravely burdensome and that the patient really wants it removed 
for good. 
A further protest is made concerning such things as gastrostomies: If not 
in experienced hands, these can become infected and lead to death. Yet if 
the alternative is certain death from dehydration, it is hard to see the force of 
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this argument. 
Much use has been made by revisionist theologians of this teaching of 
Pius XII that medical means that would interfere with some higher good, 
e.g., the patient's spiritual welfare, need not, often ought not, be used . They 
argue that a patient in PVS or in permanent coma mayor even should be 
allowed to die through the withholding of food and water or antibiotics and 
other nonburdensome treatments. Why? Because these conditions obstruct 
all goods higher than merely biological life, they destroy the ability to 
develop or respond to human relationships, they prevent one from seeking 
spiritual goods; they keep one from pursuing the goal of life. 
The obvious fallacy lies in the shift from the freedom to dispense with 
means that would interfere with the spiritual to the freedom to dispense 
with the life that is interfered with. The conscious patient whose spiritual or 
other higher good would be put at hazard by an excessively burdensome 
treatment is made equivalent to a permanently demented or unconscious 
patient whose higher goods cannot be obstructed by any conceivable means 
of treatment, being already blocked by disease. The competent patient 
chooses the higher good, though realizing death is likely to ensue as a result. 
The noncompetent patient has death chosen for him as the means to 
prevent his remaining longer in his diseased condition. 
One might also note that one of the higher goods of man is the pursuit of 
scientific, philosphical, and theological truths. Is anyone who is incapable 
of such pursuit, e.g., those afflicted by senile dementia or even if merely no 
longer capable of research, to be refused food and water? 
Here, it is important to pause a moment to consider the question of 
treatment that is "ineffective." For it would seem wholly obvious that means 
that are ineffective or useless against that which threatens one's life or health 
are not obligatory. Indeed, it would seem that, since any treatment costs 
others something in money or in time and effort, it would be wrong to 
demand ineffective treatment. There are, however, some ambiguities here 
that need to be removed before this principle can be applied in practice. 
The medical effectiveness of a particular mode of treatment can, 
depending on the patient's condition, vary from zero to total. Hence, 
effectiveness must always be defined concretely, in the context of the 
particular case. Thus, elaborate and costly efforts might be considered 
highly effective for a person whose condition might well be greatly 
improved if, by their means, he is enabled to live long enough for, say, 
certain medicamentsto take effect. Yet the same means might be regarded 
as ineffective for a patient dying of widespread melanoma. 
Some caution, however, is needed; for anything that enables someone's 
life to continue a bit longer is effective and useful in the strict sense. Thus, I 
would argue that one is obliged to eat and drink as long as possible when 
threatened by starvation or dehydration. If cast ashore on a small islet, 
where there is one banana still hanging from its plant and a little rainwater 
in a hole in the rock, one should eat the banana and drink the water since 
eating is intrinsically effective against starvation; drinking, against dying of thirst. 
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Admittedly, the obligation in this example is minimal, since the likely 
extension of one's life is so small. Yet the obligation is not simply 
nonexistent unless extrinsic circumstances should impose a contrary and 
more important one. 
There is, however, a correlation between ineffectiveness and burden-
someness. The greater the former, the greater usually will be the latter. This 
seems generally understood , though not always explicitated, with regard to 
the distinction between what we may call "crisis care" (given typically in 
response to a disease externally induced through microorganisms or 
through injury) and "chronic care" (given typically in response to some 
"natural" deterioration which results from intrinsic degeneration). For, 
evidently, much greater pain can be endured without heroism if one knows 
that the period of suffering will be short and that the results are reasonably 
assured. So, also, greater expenses can be incurred over a short time than 
the patient could afford if extended over a longer period. 
Thus, effectiveness is not merely a question of ultimate success but ofthe 
speed and ease with which this is achieved. A treatment that is medically 
certain to eliminate some threat to my life, but only after three years of 
agony, would not fall in the same class as one otherwise identical but that 
would take only three days to prove effective. Much ofthe persuasiveness of 
"quality of life" arguments comes from their explicit consideratonof this 
temporal dimension, which has, too often, been passed over in silence, 
though in no way denied, by the traditional approach. 
Conversely, the burden involved in the treatment may increase greatly if a 
usually highly effective treatment proves less effective for this particular 
patient and his situation becomes chronic. In general, as the degree of 
individual effectiveness of a given treatment decreases , the burden, if any, 
that it carries weighs the more heavily. 
Still, a more approach based solely on burdensomeness and medical 
effectiveness is not wholly adequate, as can be seen from an example. 
Suppose that in a couple of years a drug is discovered that, rightly 
administered , is 100% effective in destroying even the most widespread 
melanoma. Suppose, too, that in a short time its price becomes minimal and 
that it causes no pain or distress to the patient. Would the patient have to 
use it? For those tempted to say yes, let me add one further detail. This drug 
does have one side effect: it dissolves, even more quickly than the melanoma 
cells, the cortex of the brain. 
Explicitating Pope Pius XII's remarks, quoted above, in terms of the 
sacred, to use such a drug would be like trying to repair the ceiling of a 
church by bulldozing the altar and tabernacle, the Body of the Lord still 
present, in order to have a clear space to set up the scaffolding needed to 
reach an otherwise inaccessible spot. In other words, that which is the 
physical "locus" of what is holiest in man, his mind and will, would be 
desecrated through SUbjection to what is least. 
In other ways also it is clear that effectiveness is not measured solely by 
medical criteria. For medical effectiveness is parallel to the preservation of a 
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sacred object that is considered only in itself. Effectiveness, however, must 
be measured with reference to the entire human person - his spiritual and 
psychic strength along with his moral condition and his obligations to 
others. Thus, e.g., the sole surviving parent of a family of small children 
might well be obligated to use the most effective means available even if 
these are gravely burdensome. 
A final question concerning arguments based on the sacred: What might 
one say about the destruction of a church that can no longer be left to 
crumble because of its location in mid-city and the danger it poses to people 
and structures in the vicinity? Or, even, because of the great monetary 
outlay it requires if worse costs are to be avoided? If such destruction is 
allowed, since not implying irreverence but merely a hastening of the 
inevitable, - and in practice, at least, this seems to be the case - could not 
the same argument be used for killing the dying or even the perpetuaJly 
comatose? Do not the gradual deprivation of the powers of speech, of 
coherence, of thought, of choice, etc. in the dying or the comatose seem 
exactly equivalent to the removal of the sacred things from the church?7 
Indeed, this seems to be close to Shewmon's notion or, much less 
coherently, O'Rourke's. 
Yet unlike the material structures of a church and its appurtenances, the 
sacred in man cannot be separated into parts. One cannot find a 
counterpart to simply removing the Blessed Sacrament and carefully 
dismantling the altar temporarily in order to rebuil<;J it elsewhere later 
-though even this latter step is open to some question. Man, if alive at all, 
is one single substance, however weak be the remaining powers of bodily 
integration. If he is there at all , he is a living person and as sacrosanct as his 
family or his physician. 
Other Questions 
The criteria for morally right action by those who seek to help the sick are 
in large measure governed by the norms that govern the actions of the 
patient. Physicians must revere the sacredness of their patient, both when 
he is acting as a free agent and also when he is unconscious or close to death, 
since he is still a living recipient of the redemption of Christ. Provided, then, 
that physicians do not forget their own consecration and that of others who 
are involved, their obligations are for the most part correlative to those of 
the patient. Rather than spend what time remains on what is thus familiar to 
you, I should like to look at some of the sources of the current confusion. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a notorious cases nearly seven years 
ago now, asked, as if genuinely puzzled: 
In a case like that of Claire Conroy, for example, would a physician who 
discontinued nasogastric feeding be actively causing her death by removing her 
primary source of nutrients; or would he merely be omitting to continue the 
artificial form of treatment, thus passively allowing her medical condition, which 
includes her inability to swallow, to take its natural course?" 
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The Court, like the revIsIOnist theologians (their own designation) 
mentioned earlier, seems quite unable to understand that a human act 
requires more specification than a mere description of the external actions 
involved and one's intentions concerning likely or possible consequences. In 
the case mentioned by the Court, we need to be told what the physician 
intends to be doing by his action, e.g., relieving an intolerably painful 
breakdown oftissue produced by the tube, whether less burdensome means 
of giving nourishment are available or not or, instead, was making a quiet 
effort to end her life. 
Given the antipathy of Luther and Calvin for the very idea of man as 
sacred, one is not surprised to find Protestant theologian lames Gustafson 
unaware of the sacredness of the person, "[A] persistent vegetative state is 
not a condition in which human beings have capacities for significant 
responsiveness; thus the qualities that distinguish human beings and are the 
basis of human valuing of, and respect for, persons no longer exist."lo 
Clearly, for Gustafson, the person is to be "valued" and "respected" solely 
for his ability to interact "significantly" with other people. This clearly 
would find sacredness, if at all, not in the decision of Christ but in the nature 
of the sacred "object" - in Gustafson's approach, this must be the 
appropriate word. 
Worse yet are such ethicians as Daniel Callahan, who says that the 
"irreversibly comatose, utterly vegetative" patient has "not meaningful life 
of any kind - it is a mere body only, notan embodied person."11 Similarly, 
Fr. lohn Paris, S.l ., speaks of those defending the continued feeding of 
PVS patients as "placing the maintenance of mere biological existence 
above all other considerations. "12 For these men and their like minded peers, 
the enormous metaphysical question as to the unity of the person is simply 
assumed answered: the living human body is no longer to be identified with 
the human person. When one is in PVS, the person has already died . Alan 
Shewmon, more honestly and carefully, has stated expressly that such 
patients and indeed the senile demented are dead. What we deal with is a 
human cadaver that is at the same time a humanoid animal. And as a 
cadaver, not only may treatment be stopped but the animal may be directly 
killed and disposed of. Philosophically, nothing less is at issue here than a 
choice between a quasi-Cartesian dualism and a Christian understanding of 
the spiritual and material unity of the living person. 
More interesting, perhaps, is Fr. McCormick's own most recent view. 13 
He argues that a medical technology ought to be used if it will bring about 
"( I) a return to relatively normal health: (2) ultimate independence from the 
technology." Then, "in some instances, the difference between a dying and a 
nondying patient is rooted in a value judgment about whether we ought to 
use the available technology or not." Hence, patients "are 'not dying' only if 
we judge that we ought to feed them artificially." So, in the Brophy case, one 
is not causing a preventable death by cutting off food and water for "Paul 
Brophy is a dying patient - unless we give him a tube gastrostomy. Should 
we?" Strangely, in the Brophy case, the gastrostomy was already long in 
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place; the only legitimate question was: shall we continue to use it? 
Evidently, though he seems quite unaware of the fact, Fr. McCormick is 
trying to restore some sort of moral dimension to the description of a moral 
act. One may not, either he or we, say that every withdrawal of treatment is 
murder or, conversely, virtuous. 
But is it desirable to achieve this goal by turning the definition of the 
physiological deterioration, already at work, that dying is, into a value 
judgment about the utility of means? Are we to replace a prediction that 
someone will die by a "value judgment" that he is now dying - this based 
on the decision that we ought not to help him live, indeed, that he ought to 
die? How would Fr. McCormick's principles apply to one like Fred Snite, 
so many years in his iron lung, never to be returned to normal life or to be 
independent of this technology? However laudable Fr. McCormick's 
intentions, he has reduced a complex discussion to total confusion. As the 
perhaps foreseeable result of this confusion, he winds up finally in 
agreement with the New Jersey Supreme Court, Daniel Callahan, and Fr. 
Paris. Of the sacredness of the person there is no trace, nor of the entire 
Catholic tradition in moral theology built thereon. 
Conclusion 
Much work remains to be done to reintegrate fully the ancient categories 
of the sacred and the holy into contemporary moral theology. Yet I hope to 
have shown that such reintegration is both possible and useful, and that it 
can shed some light on problems that seem less tractable on other grounds. 
Since all of us have had some experience of the sacred, in ways probably 
fairly diverse, all - and not merely experts in medical ethics - have 
something to contribute. 
There is, of course, a major difficulty: Those who are leading the drive for 
euthanasia are, as a group, quite unconcerned about the sacred. As I argued 
some years back,14 it is quite possible to show that there exists a secular 
understanding of the sacred, which can be defended on purely philosophical 
grounds. Yet ethical arguments do not of themselves make men good; and 
secular notions of the sacred offer too bloodless an ideal to move very 
many. 
If abortion and euthanasia are the problems they are, it is faith and the 
life in Christ that are missing. For whatever reasons, we Catholics have too 
often fought shy of the religious question. We have not always remembered 
that we are obligated at all times to bear witness to our Lord and to His 
Church by both our personal and our professional lives, by word as well as 
by action. Too often we - I speak here of us Jesuits and of the times long 
before Vatican II as well as since - have tended to give pride of place to 
philosophy rather than to the life of faith in order, I think, to have some 
common grounds with our fellow citizens, forgetting that, even were these 
to be convinced by our philosophy, the power to live well comes through 
grace and faith. 
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For us all, then, the center, the focal issue, the field where the battle will 
be won or lost, lies in the witness we ourselves are now willing to give to 
Christ and His Church. My guess is that some of you here will be martyrs to 
the faith within a decade because of the outspoken witness you are giving 
and the effectiveness of your efforts against the varied forms ofkilling ofthe 
innocent. Those who do not wish to be told that they are doing evil and 
risking God's eternal punishment by their actions can respond fiercely. 
And, as at the Reformation, those who are strongest against you need not 
be secular humanists but may be fellow Catholics who have set aside some 
of the Church's teachings and are angered by any who would reproach 
them. But I am no prophet. Continue in the faith our Lord has given you 
and you are certain to have the power and strength of His Holy Spirit when 
needed, whatever the circumstances. God bless you all. 
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